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21 June 48-M-DC-9-4-Hoxsie (Schaeffer) 




THE PRESIDENT:  You may call the next witness, Dr. Leverkuehn.  
 






WALTER WARLIMONT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: 
 
THE PRESiDENT:  I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will 
speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.  
 
(The witness repeated the oath.)  
 
THE PRESIDENT: You will be seated,.  
 
DIRECT EXAMINATION  
 
BY DR. LEVERKUEHN:  
 
Q.  Please state your nane, your surname and Christian name.  
 
A.  Walter Warlimont. 
 
Q.  When were you born?  
 
A.  On the 3rd of October, 1894.  
 
Q.  Where? 
 
A.  Osnabruck in northwest Germany.  
 
Q.  Where did your family originate?  
 
A.  My parents were both born in the German-Belgium frontier  
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area, Eupen-Malmedy. My family, on my father's side, originated in the 
Belgium Ardenees Mountains, where large circles of his family still live 
today.  
 
Q.  Where did you attend school?  
 
A.  I attended school in Osnabruck, the Humanistic Gymnasium, but I left 
at my matriculation at the beginning of 1913.  
 
Q.  What profession did you take up thereafter?  
 
A.  Immediately after having finished school in February, 1913, I entered 
an artillery regiment in Strassburg in Alsace.  
 
Q.  At the outbreak of the war, 1914, were you already an officer?  
 
A.  Yes, after having attended the military school in Danzig for nine 
months, in July 1914, one month before the outbreak of the First World 
War I was promoted to officer.  
 
Q.  In what assignments did you participate in the First World War? 
 
A.  During the First World War I was a front line officer in the 
artillery.  
 
Q.  What was your rank at the conclusion of the First World War?  
 
A.  First Lieutenant.  
 
Q.  What did you do after the First World War?  
 
A.  A short while after the war I entered the Free Corps of General 
Merker which was stationed in central Germany, and participated 
particularly in the suppression of Communistic insurrections.  When the 
100,000 man army was formed, I was taken over into an artillery regiment 
with a rank of first lieutenant.  
 
Q.  How did that period of your service close, witness?  
 
A.  Two or three years after the First World War I remained in the 
artillery, and then I was commanded to a training course for Fuehrer-
Gehilk in Military District Command 6 in Muenster.  
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Q.  Who was your teacher there?  
 
A.  The later Chief of General Staff, General Beck.  
 
Q.  Did you have personal or official relations with him prior to this 
period?  
 
A.  Yes, prior to that he had been my battalion commander in the 
artillery regiment of the 100,000 man amy.  
 
Q.  After you had finished your training did you immediately return to 
the troops?  
 
A.  No, at the conclusion of this training period I was given a 
scholarship to go to England to study languages.  
 
Q.  Had you been abroad at an earlier time?  
 
A.  Yes, from my earliest youth onwards I went every year, sometimes to 
Belgium, and later on as a senior scholar, and after the war as a young 
officer, I made several trips to Switzerland and Italy.  
 
Q.  Did you return to the front after your stay in England?  
 
A.  No. In Fall 1926 I was commanded to the General Staff, or as it was 
callen [sic] then, to the Fuherstaf. My first position was the one of a 
second adjutant to tho Chief of the Truppenamt in the Reich War Miinistry 
in Berlin.  
 
Q.  What were your tasks there?  
 
A.  In this position I only had to deal with the anteroom work in a 
similar way as my A. D. C. who just testified here.  
 
Q.  And thereafter what became of you?  
 
A.  I remained in that position for six months, and thereafter I was 
transferred to the Heereswanffenamt. There I had to concern myself with 
the military econonic experiences of the First World War.  German 
experiences as well as foreign experiences were my sphere of task there.  
 
Q. How long did you remain in thatposition [sic]?  
 
A.  First of all I remained there for two years, from Spring, 1927, to 
Spring, 1929.  
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Q.  And then?  
 
A.  In Spring 1929, I was commanded to the Army of the United States for 
one year in order to study the economic mobilization of the array there.  
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Q  Was it customary that German officers were commanded to foreign 
armies?  
 
A.  After the First World War that had been the first case of this 
type.  Another captain of my own age went with me who had also worked in 
the Reich Defense Ministry, and he was commanded to the Air Corps of the 
Army of the United States in order to study those matters which we had 
lost during the ten post war years.  
 
Q  Why do you think that you were chosen for this assignment?  
 
A  Minly [sic] I believe the selection of my person was connected with my 
official activity which I had carried out in the two previous years.  I 
had concerned myself with the German military economy after the First 
World War, and therefore, I was one of the very few officers who was 
suitable for this reason to study economic mobilization in the United 
States.  An additional factor might have been that my wife and her  
 
mother were a branch of the Anheuser-Busch family in St. Louis, and she 
spent her school years during the First World War in the United States, 
and her brother lived there for twenty years.  
 
Q  Now, who assigned the mission to you to proceed to the Army of the 
United States?  
 
A  The mission originated with the then Reich Defense Minister Groener, 
because, as I learned at that time, he had personally concluded the 
agreements for this mission with the American War Ministry.  
 
Q  How were you received in the American Army?  
 
A  I was welcomed with great hospitality and all possibilities were 
opened to me to carry out my studies.  
 
Q  Were you able to show your recognition and appreciation?  
 
A  I tried to do that at the time after I had looked around somewhat in 
the United States.  In Washington, before the officers of the War 
Department, I gave a number of lectures about the German military 
economic experiences of the First World War, and also about artillery 
matters.  
21 June 1948-M-DJG-10-2-Hoxsie (Schaeffer) 
COURT V, CASE XII  
 
Q  Was your assignment restricted to Washington?  
 
A  No, I spent approximately half of this one year, which was the period 
of my assignment in Washington.  During the other six months, I visited 
the rest of the United States, and at the end for two months I was 
assigned to an artillery regiment in Texas. 
 
Q  Apart from the military economic purpose, did Groener explain any 
other purposos of this mission to you?  
 
A  Yes, Reich Defense Minister Groener received me in person briefly 
before my departure to the United States. On this occasion he told me, 
even more important than the study of economic mobilization was it for  
 
me to obtain as many friendly contacts as possible with officers of the 
Army of the United States.  
 
Q  Were you in a position to keep up such contacts at a later time?  
 
A  I believe I can state that I succeeded in fulfilling this mission at 
the time and I cultivated these contacts later on.  I tried to express my 
gratitude.  
 
Q How could you manage to keep up contact with American officers later on 
in Germany? 
 
A  The consewuence [sic] of this assignment was that I maintained contact 
principally with officers of the American Embassy in Berlin.  Those 
gentleman visited me even when I was outside Berlin with troops.  They 
visited me mainly during large troop maneuvers.  These contacts were also 
cultivated mainly during the time when I served in Berlin proper. 
 
Q  Contacts with whom? 
 
A  I believe that between 1933 and 1939 I knew all officers who worked in 
the American Embassy, but primarily I know very closely the military 
attache who served there from 1936 to 1939, this was the then Lieutenant 
Colonel Truman Smith. 
 
Q  About that portion of your testimony we are going to submit two 
affidavits which are Documents 57 and 87.  They are affidavits of 
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Truman Smith and of Heidel.  Did you later on succeed in returning to the 
United States?  
 
A  No. It was my most urgent desire to be military attache in Washington 
myself, but this wish was never fulfilled. 
 
Q  What assignment did you have after you returned from your American 
command? 
 
A  For a few months I concerned myself with putting down my impressions 
and experiences in written reports.  In fall, 1930, just six months after 
my return, I was transferred to East Prussia as Chief of a battery.  
 
Q  How long did you remain there? 
 
A  I remained there for two and a half years.  thereafter, in April, 
1933, I returned to the Reich Defense Ministry with the rank of a major, 
and once again I was assigned to the Heereswaffenamt, my former sphere of 
tasks. 
 
Q  To whom were you subordinate in the Heereswaffenamt?  
 
A  In this second sector of my activity I was subordinate to General 
Georg Thomas, the Chief of the Military Economic Staff.  That was in 
1932. 
 
Q  What was your duty from then on? 
 
A  From 1932 to 1934, I was in charge of a working camp in this staff 
which consisted of a captain and myself.  It was then my duty to create 
the basis for a German military economic organization which had not so 
far existed.  In addition to these tasks I acted as an instructor in the 
tactical sphere.  I taught the officers of the Heereswaffenamt, and, as 
far as the military economic sphere was concerned, I lectured to the 
officers of the military academy and the Armed Forces academy. 
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did bring me into a certain contact with the industry as such, inasmuch 
as industry, of course, immediately participated in the organization of 
military economic organization.  
 
Q  Did you attend conferences of the so-called Reich Defense Committee 
and can you tell us what kind of an organization this was? 
 
A. I attended such conferences repeatedly between 1933 and 1936.  The 
conferences took place at intervals of three months. This committee 
comprised the representatives of all those civilian ministries who  
 
participated in tho national defense.  
 
Q  I beg your pardon.  
 
A  In the conferences the representatives of these civilian ministries 
met with those officers of the Reich Defense Ministry who were 
responsible for the corresponding spheres of activity.  All in all the 
number of participants in such conferences was about one hundred to one 
hundred and fifty, half civilians and half offers. 
 
Q  Did you attend on your own initiative, or did you accompany General 
Thomas, or did you deputize for him? 
 
A  In accordance with my rank and my position I could only attend these 
conferences as accompanying General Thomas.  
 
Q  Who directed the Reich Defense Committee?  
 
A  During the first years this committee was directed by the Chief of the 
General Staff who was at the time General Beck.  Later on, the direction 
of this committee was turned over to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Amt, 
General von Reichenau and over General Keitel. 
 
Q  What was the line pursued by Beck in this Reich Defense Committee? 
 
A  The line and the task of this committee was to take the most urgent 
general measures in Germany which as completely disarmed, measures which 
were urgently necessary for the defense of the borders.  Also outside the 
Wehrmacht.  Those were measures which were taken in all countries in the 
world who were able to defend themselves, measures which were taken to a 
large extent after the 1st World War and which even 
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today are the most natural duties of any national defense.  
 
Q  In the work of this committee did you ever hear anything said that 
Germany intended to wage an aggressive war?  
 
A  The conception of an aggressive was unfamiliar to me at the time.  It 
was a word that was not used in the German language.  At any rate in this 
committee not one simple word about war plans on Germany's own initiative 
were never mentioned.  The large number of participants excluded this, 
even if such intentions had existed. 
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Q  How was the defense idea formulated which Beck gave the Defense 
Committee to work on? 
 
A  The most important task which always formed the larger part of the 
deliberations was the evacuation from the border areas of the 
inhabitants, above all of the able-bodied male population and valuable 
goods.  Large parts of Germany, however, were also counted amongst border 
areas; for instance, the whole left bank of the Rhine in the West, the 
whole of the province of Silesia in the East, other plans even included 
the North Sea and Baltic Coast into this scheme and thus preconcluded 
that Germany would be completely cut off from its seaports.  Eventually a 
third reflection was made.  Zones were established for these purposes at 
the time and the third plan even included the omission of the Ruhr area 
and the Province of Saxony.  In spite of all this, in this mutilated 
remainder of Germany a defense was still thought possible for the nucleus 
of the country. 
 
Q  In order to conclude the topic of your connection with this particular 
sphere of activity I want to anticipate for a moment a period of time in 
your later assignments and I want to ask you now whether later on when 
you were Chief of the Department of National Defense you were still 
connected with this particular sphere of activity? 
 
A  Yes, when in the late Fall of 1938 I was called back into the Reich 
War Ministry and became Chief of Department L, National Defense, I found 
in this department the so-called Secretariat for the Civilian Defense of 
the Reich.  This Secretariat was formed by Group IV of the Division of 
National Defense.  The tasks of this group, as its name already 
indicates, were to deal with the business affairs and to comprise the 
tasks of National Defense.  The Secretariat had to concern itself mainly 
with the coordination of civilian and military measures. 
 
Q  As the Chief of this Secretariat did you in June 1939 attend a session 
of the National Defense Committee? 
 
A  Yes, that was the only session of the so-called Reich Defense 
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Council in contrast to the Committee which up to that time I had got to 
know.  To the best of my knowledge this was the only session which was 
held by this council.  In contrast to the Committee the council comprised 
the Minister themselves; whereas, in the Committee their representatives 
were present.  I participated in this session as Chief of the Secretariat 
who had to make the necessary preparations for the course of the 
conference, for the agenda of the conference, and for the later minutes 
of the conference. 
 
Q  Who was the Chairman of this Reich Defense Council? 
 
A  Goering. 
 
Q  How during this session were plans discussed which might serve as an 
aggression or or the preparation of an aggression? 
 
A  No, during this conference, too, which took place three months before 
the outbreak of the war not one word was said about imminent 
war.  Instead, the fundamental tasks which were to be allotted to this 
Reich Defense Council were elaborated during this conference. 
 
Q  Can you remember certain items of the program which were discussed? 
 
A  I remember particularly well that the Military Chief of Railroad 
Transportation, who was even then Colonel or Brigadier-General Gehrko, 
reported on the state of affairs in the Reichbahn, the Reich Railways 
with a view to their possible military exploitation.  During this report 
it was stated that the Reich Railways were not ready for war because 
during the past years they had been neglected in their material and 
financial aspects.  Thereupon, it was declared in this session that as of 
1940 a five-year program was to start which was to eliminate these 
damages to the Reich Railways and thus enable them to fulfill possible 
military tasks. 
 
Q  How long did that Reich Defense Council exist? 
 
A  Strangely enough this whole organization was dissolved approximately 
ten days before the beginning of the war. 
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Q  And what took the place of this organization? 
 
A  The so-called Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, a 
creation of Goering's which was completely supported by the organization 
of the Party; whereas the Reich Defense Council had been an organization 
which had grown out of the State, in which the Ministries had been 
represented and which in its subdivisions was mainly supported by the 
Armed Forces.  Now, this new organization had only a few selected 
Ministers as its members; the official business direction was no longer 
supported by the military districts of the Armed Forces but by the Party 
districts. 
 
Q  Did you have a position within this organization or did you have any 
liaison to this organization? 
 
A  No, none. 
 
Q  Now, I should like to return to the development of your military 
career.  We had stopped, I believe, in 1936.  At this time in 1936 you 
were where? 
 
A  I was still in the Reich Defense Ministry.  In the meantime I had 
become Chief of the Military Economic Division under General Thomas and 
since summer 1935 I was a Lieutent-Colonel [sic]. 
 
Q  And that position concluded when you took what new assignment? 
 
A  That position concluded when in August 1936 I was sent to Spain to 
Franco as the representative of the Reich War Minister Fieldmarshal von 
Blomberg. 
 
Q  Were you sent to Spain as a member of the German Armed Forces? 
 
A  As a matter of form I was discharged from the Armed Forces for this 
very purpose. 
 
Q  What was the situation in Spain at the time? 
 
A  In the middle of July civil war had broken out in Spain. 
 
Q  Did you have any contact with Spain prior to that? 
 
A  I neither had any connection swith Spain nor did I speak the Spanish 
language nor had I concerned myself in any way with what went on in Spain 
prior to going there. 
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Q  Then why do you think you were chosen for this particular assignment? 
 
A  Field Marshal von Blomberg when I met again here in the prison in 
1945, three years ago, told me that he had primarily chosen me for this 
mission for personal reasons. 
 
Q  What description of the conditions and of your sphere of tasks was 
given to you by the Reich War Minister von Blomberg when you left? 
 
A  Von Blomberg told me at that time, in August 1936, that civil war in 
Spain was expanding more and more.  Hitler was determined, together with 
Italy, to give General Franco further military support if necessary. 
 
Q  Up to that time what did the German support of Spain consist of? 
 
A  Up to that time only a group of transport planes, altogether 
approximately thirty, had been sent to Spain. 
 
Q  With members of the Armed Forces? 
 
A  These planes were manned by volunteers who as far as I know we [sic] 
were not all members of the Armed Forces but were partly members of the 
Lufthansa.  For the protection of these transport planes, a fighter unit 
had been sent after which, as far as I know, consisted of 6 to 8 planes. 
 
Q  Did Blomberg tell you that Germany's support was to become much more 
extensive? 
 
A  No, on the contrary; he told me that the extent of the German support 
for Franco could only remain a small one, if only because of our armament 
position which at that time was only about to be developed. 
 
Q  And how did he think this support was to be carried? 
 
A  As a matter of principle support was only to be rendered by our making 
war material available if such was needed.  We were to train Spanish 
soldiers in the use of this equipment, and as to our own personnel, we 
were only to give as much as was necessary for this purpose. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  At this time we will take our recess until 1:30 o'clock. 
 
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.) 
<p style="text-align: center;">[....] 
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Wehrmacht branches were standing around in the hall and Keitel 
rushed over to me and said everything is stopped again.  The advance has 
been stopped. The war won't take place. Everything has already been 
ordered. You can see Brauchitsch and Raeder here. Write it all down on 
paper again. Here too it seemed oral orders which had come from the OKW 
had to be set down in writing. I did not find any opportunity to ask 
Keitel about the reasons. He was in too much of a hurry, so I asked 
Schmundt, Hitler's ADC, and he said to me that the British had 
intervened. The Guarantee Treaty with Poland has been ratified by the 
British Parliament and this has changed everything. In reply to my 
question whether this meant finally that Hitler's intentions against 
Poland were to be dropped, he just shrugged his shoulders and I know in 
addition on the next day that Field Marshal von Brauchitsch repeatedly 
said to Hitler you must now decide, Fuehrer whethor you want to take 
military action against Poland or not, because as we are now standing on 
the German-Polish frontier we cannot remain for very long. This is a 
military impossibility. Therefore, we must either go forward or we must 
dissolve the troop concentrations again and this too seemed to me to show 
that Hitler still hadn't decided what he wanted to do and that Field 
Marshal von Brauchitsch didn't know either what Hitler's intention was.  
 
However, I don't want to leave the point unmentioned that the regaining 
of Danzig and the German eastern territory was actually the 
highest national aim of all Germans at that time, but we soldiers on the 
other hand were convinced that Germany was strong enough to get rid of 
these unbearable consequences of the Versailles Treaty without a war.  
That was the opinion of my level of the officers corps.  
 
DR. LEVERKUEHN: In this connection we would like to submit an affidavit 
from Field Marshal von Manstein about the conference of the 22d of August 
1939. This is Document Warlimont 66 but I now would like to turn  
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to Document Book 14 which is mainly concerned with Norway.  
 
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Leverkuehn when you say you are submitting that you 
mean you are going to submit it later. You are no [sic] offering it 
for identification now?  
 
DR. LEVERKUEHN: No, your Honor, unfortunately the translations which we 
discussed yesterday are not yet finished and therefore I could 
only submit them in the German. I would rather submit the texts to the 
Tribunal in German and in English at the same time, but I would just like 
to mention the numbers which we are going to submit.  
 
THE PRESIDENT: That is entirely proper, I just wanted to make sure that I 
wasn't overlooking documents or something.  
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DR. LEVERKUEHN:  No, your Honor, not at all. 
 
Q (By Dr. Leverkuehn) The first document is Exhibit 1121, C-63, Document 
Book XIV, English Page 45, German, Page 102.  Please would you comment on 
this document? 
 
A  This is an instruction from the Chief of the OKW, that is Keitel, and 
it bears his signature, and it is dated the 27th of January, 1940.  The 
communication is directed to the Commands of the Army, Navy and Air 
Force.  It states that the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces desires that work on the Study N, that is probably Norway, be 
continued in a special staff of the OKW. 
 
Q  Did you participate in the drawing up of this instruction? 
 
A  No, I did not.  This instruction was worked out without my 
participation, and a definite sign of this is that on the letter heading 
at the top no expert group of the Division National Defense is noted.  It 
only states there the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the 
Chief of the OKW, and then a number and then the secret sign, and finally 
the letters "WFA", the Wehrmacht Fuehrungsamt, the Wehrmacht Operational 
Office, Department L, Department National Defense.  If the instruction 
had even only been written in the National Defense Division then here the 
group of the division concerned would have been entered, but this is not 
the case.  This is one of the cases in which Keitel or Jodl himself drew 
up such instructions, and they were written down by their own A.D.C. or 
another officer, and then the Division National Defense or the registry 
merely had to give it a reference number.  This was necessary in order 
that the communication was properly registered and above all was properly 
registered as a top secret matter.  But I would like to add that there 
were also communications which were so worked out without the 
participation of the Division, 
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in which a working group of the Division National Defense was 
noted.  This can be explained by the fact that the registry also had this 
information as well because they knew to which working group of the 
division such a communication belonged.  Therefore, a complete letterhead 
is in no way a proof that this communication was dealt with within the 
staff of the division under my direction.  
 
Q  In this instruction, Exhibit 1121, a study is mentioned.  Do you 
remember this study? 
 
A  No, I do not remember anything at all about this study, but this may 
have some connection with the fact that from the middle of December, 
1939, until approximately the 10th of January, 1940, first of all because 
of an official trip to the West, I was absent, and then I went on 
Christmas leave, and subsequently I was sick.  But after having seen this 
instruction here again in Nurnberg [sic], I made inquiries about this 
study, and I also saw a notice about it in Jodl's diary.  The result of 
these inquiries was the following: After the oral report of the Commander 
of the Navy to Hitler about the question of the occupation of Norway on 
the 12th of December, 1939, Jodl gave the commissions that such a study 
should be set up.  Accoding to his war diary he gave this commission to 
Captain von Sternburg, the Air Force officer in the National Defense 
Division.  He together with Corvette Captain Junge of the National 
Defense Division worked out this study within twenty-four hours, and 
already because of this very limited time, and because of the lack of any 
kind of data at all, this study, according to the information I find, 
only contained a lot of platitudes to the effect that if one took any 
action against Norway one would have to occupy the ports, and then there 
was a short comment about the strength which would be necessary for such 
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Q  What were the conditions on which this study was based, and what was 
the political situation on which it was based? 
 
A  The study was based on what the Commanding Chief of the Navy had told 
Hitler, and what Jodl, who was also again present on this occasion, had 
told Captain von Sternburg about it.  This can only be an indication of 
the fact that the danger of an imminent landing by the Allies existed, 
and that this danger had to be eliminated by an occupation of our own 
beforehand. 
 
Q  What did you find out about plans regarding Norway? 
 
A  I can't tell you anything definite about this, but I think I can 
remember that when I returned in the middle of January I heard about it 
for the first time, the middle of January, 1940. 
 
Q  The indictment asserts that since September you had already spoken 
with Quisling and Hagelin about Norway, is that correct? 
 
A  I only know the name of Quisling as everybody in the world knows 
it.  I never saw the man, and I never had any communication with him, 
either in writing or orally, and I was never in any immediate direct or 
indirect contact with him, and I don't know the name Hagelin at all. 
 
Q  The working staff is ordered in the instruction, did this working 
staff ever meet? 
 
A  Yes, this working staff met at the beginning of February, 1940, under 
the designation "Special Staff". 
 
Q  And who told it about its tasks? 
 
A  I can only say according to Jodl's war diary that Keitel told the 
three officers of this staff about their work. 
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Q  And what was the relation of this staff to the National Defense 
Division? 
 
A  As I said yesterday in another connection, I had to accommodate these 
three officers in rooms in my department, my division in the Reich 
Wehrministry. 
 
Q  Did they have any official contact with you? 
 
A  No.  Out of pure interest I found out now their work was getting on, 
but I didn't have any right to give them orders, and I didn't have any 
kind of official contact with them at all. 
 
Q  And what happened to this stuff? 
 
A  The staff as such existed not quite three weeks because Hitler then 
decided that the preparations which had been made up to them as a form of 
study were to be transformed into serious preparations.  The reason for 
this was, I think, the permanently, continuously increasing danger of an 
occupation by the Allies.  As a result he delegated General von 
Falkenhorst and his corps headquarters to continue with the further 
preparations.  The three officers of the so-called Special Staff, 
therefore, went over into the staff of General Falkenhorst. 
 
Q  Did you then take part in discussions and oral reports about the 
Norwegian plans? 
 
A  No, not in one single case. 
 
Q  With regard to this question too, I would like to mention Warliamont 
Exhibit No. 64.  It is an affidavit of General von Engel.  I would now 
like to turn to Document 1129, C-174, Document Book XIV, English Page 9, 
German, Page 168.  This document is headed, "Directive for Operation 
Weseruebung".  What does this Weseruebung mean? 
 
A  Weseruebung was the code name for the occupation of Norway, and at 
this time probably Denmark too. 
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Q  And what is this document about? 
 
A  This is the directive for the execution of the occupation of Norway, 
dated the 1st of March 1940, and it is signed by Hitler. 
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Q.  And to what extent was the National Defense Division involved in 
this? 
 
A.  The Division merely looked after the issuance of this directive in 
this instance too.  There is no expert group of the Division entered. 
 
Q  When did you hear about the possibility of the occupation of Denmark, 
and what did you discover about the reasons? 
 
A.  I can't remember exactly when I found out about it.  It must have 
been probably in February, 1940.  With regard to the reasons, at that 
time I only knew that the Air Force had asked for the occupation of 
Denmark. 
 
Q.  Now, I would like to turn to two exhibits which I would like to put 
to you together, 1126 and 1127.  1126 is Document D-629, in Document Book 
XIV, English page 73, German, page 146.  Exhibit 1127 is Document NG-
3817, also in Document Book XIV, English page 77, German page 150. 
 
A.  Both documents are communications from the OKH to the Foreign 
Office.  The one is dated the 2nd of April, and the other one is dated 
the 20th of April, 1940.  The communications contain the desires and the 
requests of the Wehrmacht which at the beginning of the occupation were 
to be represented by the members of the Foreign Office of Denmark and 
Copenhagen to the heads of the Government of Denmark and Norway.  In the 
main they are concerned with inducing these governments to agree with the 
military occupation end in this way to avoid unnecessary loss of blood.   
 
Q.  What was the participation of the National Defense Division in the 
drawing up of these communications? 
 
A.  These communications, too, according to their contents, were drawn up 
completely without our participation.  The contents concern 
considerations and suggestions for General von Falkenhorst and other 
organizations, which are known to me, made during the conference with 
Hitler under the orders which Hitler had made at that time.  The Division 
then received the commission from Jodl to compile all this. 
 
Q.  Then what was your personal opinion of the situation with regard to 
Norway, and did you express anything about it officially in any way? 
 
A.  Yes.  Only the idea cropped up that Norway should be occupied. 
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I, just the same as other officers, could not exclude the idea that here 
a danger must be avoided which would mean death for the German military 
leadership, because the British Air Force in Norway meant a complete 
control of the German living space, and the Franco-British occupation of 
the Norwegian ports meant a cutting off of Germany from the sea and above 
all from Swedish ore [sic].  For me in my further judgments about it, the 
main thing was to recognize whether this danger of an occupation by the 
Allies actually existed.  The execution of the German measures against 
Norway at that time were dealyed [sic] unexpectedly long because the 
whole of the Baltic Sea, in contract to normal times, was frozen 
over.  With this, the final date for a possible occupation of Norway 
became ever nearer to the date on which Hitler wanted to attack in the 
west, and so I said to myself, "As soon as the German Wehrmacht takes 
action in the West, the British and the French, without doubt, will have 
no more forces available to attack on their part."  The German attack 
would involve all the Franco-British forces in the west and bind them 
there. 
 
In addition, I said to myself that the question or the pretext which the 
British and the French would use for the occupation of Norway, and which 
they thought they had found in the Russo-Finnish War, was no longer in 
existance [sic], because in the meantime peace had occurred.  Based on 
these two considerations during the second part of March, 1940, I thought 
that the danger of an Allied occupation of Norway was no longer existant 
[sic], and in this judgment it also seemed to me that for Germany too it 
was no longer necessary or would even be damaging for this extension of 
the war to be carried out in a territory far distant, or even to take 
this into consideration and in this way to involve further parts of 
Europe in the war and all its consequences.  As a result, in the second 
half of March I set down a written opinion of the situation with these 
comments and submitted it to Jodl.  This judgment concluded with the 
suggestion that the occupation of Norway should not be carried out, and, 
of course, Denmark too. 
 
It is significant, and at that time I found it a very bitter pill too, 
that I didn't even get an answer to it, and in this context must again 
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use Jodl's declaration which was supposed to have been given here on the 
26th of September.  If, as in this statement, I really had met him every 
single day and really had been present at all Hitler's discussions, then 
this train of thought would never have arisen in my mind, because it was 
exactly that opposite of what was happening in the Reich Chancellery, but 
in addition I wouldn't have told Jodl about my ideas in writing, but I 
would have told him orally about them, and I wouldn't have tried to get 
any answer at all.  In addition it is in complete contradiction to what 
Jodl wrote down in his diary, in the comment in which a large part is 
played by the statement that the Fuehrer is still looking for a reason 
for the occupation of Norway, and this was not my opinion. 
 
Q.  Was the National Defense Division concerned in the operational 
measures during the occupation of Norway? 
 
A.  No, just as little as it was in the Polish campaign.  Neither at that 
time nor at any time later was I in Norway in contrast to all the other 
theaters of war. 
 
Q.  The intelligence about the intentions of the Allies, which were known 
to you at that time, could this intelligence be taken as a fact that they 
were seriously thinking of an occupation? 
 
A.  I think I have just said that until approximately the middle of March 
I was firmly convinced that this danger was imminent, and that Germany, 
with its own preparations as far as they were known to me, was completely 
within the scope of a justified defensive measure. 
 
DR. LEVERKUEHN:  Shall I turn to another point now, your Honor? 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Our time has expired and we will be in recess fifteen 
minutes. 
 
(A recess was taken.) 
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THE MARSHAL:  The Tribunal is again in session. 
 
DR. LATERNSER:  Your Honor, on behalf of the whole of the defense I would 
like to submit some facts to the Tribunal.  It will be rather brief and 
will you be good enough to give me a hearing.  On 8 June 1948 at Radio 
Munich a public discussion took place between a member of the Staff of 
Radio Munich and a member of the Prosecution team appearing before this 
Tribunal.  It caused considerable public interest and comment.  Defense 
counsel has asked Radio Munich for a copy of the text which they received 
yesterday.  it showed that the following comments were made and I quote. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  You may proceed. 
 
DR. LATERNSER:  "Speaker: (That is the speaker of Radio Munich said)  The 
Prosecution has as far as I know closed it case.  We are now in the 
defense.  Can you tell us how the result of the evidence could be 
summarized.  Can it be assumed that the counts of the indictment have 
been proved or how does the matter stand?"  The answer was, among others, 
and I quote: "In Nurnberg since August 1945, that is to say I was here 
right at the beginning with Mr. Jackson.  I cooperated directly or 
indirectly in almost all trials which were conducted in Nurnberg--". 
 
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Doctor Laternser.  What is the purpose of 
this? 
 
Dr. LATERNSER: Your Honor I would like to put an enquiry to the court as 
to whether the proceedings of the Prosecution in this case are fair.  If 
it is fair then the defense would reserve the right, they would ask for 
the right, to act in the same manner, to make comments over the 
radio.  However, we have scruples that if we did so, since this is a 
pending case, we would expose ourselves to the possibility of committing 
contempt upon the court.  We cannot judge this and therefore we would 
like to put the question to the Tribunal. 
 
MR RAPP:  If the court pleases, maybe I can shorten this in two  
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sentences.  The person in question was myself.  It has been customary 
occasionally to give our own opinions over the radio.  That was at the 
very beginning over the radio and that is what the Americans are trying 
to do, to expose the Germans to make such statements of free speech at 
their own time.  The defense counsel has done it repeatedly in their own 
case.  They have been invited if they want to give their statements over 
the German radio, what they think about this case, without making any 
reference to the Tribunal or prejudicing the case as such.  I don't think 
this has to go any further; it is just like writing an article.  I don't 
think it belongs in this court room.  If Dr. Laternser wants to answer me 
over the radio I'm sure Radio Munich would be glad to listen to him. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: What is your question, whether you can make a radio 
speech? 
 
DR. LATERNSER: No, your Honor.  I wanted to ask whether the conduct of 
the Prosecution was fair in this case because in replying I don't want to 
incur the commission of a contempt of court because we as German defense 
counsel do not know as well as you these regulations or as if we had been 
nurtured in American law and that is what I and my colleagues are asking 
for. 
 
THE PRESIDENT:  In other words, you want the privilege of making comments 
over the radio yourself?  Is that what you are asking the Tribunal? 
 
DR. LATERNSER:  In the first place I wanted to ask whether the conduct of 
the Prosecution was fair, that is, that in a pending trial they commented 
on the defendants. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what the rest of the Tribunal know about 
it.  I don't know anything baout what the Prosecution said and that has 
not been brought before us as to whether it is contempt of this court and 
I certainly don't know what the defense has it in mind to say and I have 
always found it difficult to know whether it was 
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contempt of court after the thing was said.  Personally, when I have been 
a Prosecutor and when I have been on the defense I have always found that 
on either side it took most of my time to attend to the case.  But, if 
you want anything further on this I will discuss the matter as far as it 
has gone with the Tribunal and advise you whether there is anything 





DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) 
 
BY DR. LEVERKUEHN 
 
Q.  In conclusion I would state regarding Norway that we have attempted 
to submit to the Tribunal the notes mentioned by the defendant in his 
testimony.  However we were unable to find them among the documents from 
Washington.  However, we shall submit an affidavit which will appear in a 
supplementary volume.  We will submit testimony of his assistants.  I 
will now turn to the next section, that is the first document of Book 13, 
Exhibit 1074, Document C-129, page 29 of the English and 84 of the 
German.  Now, before making any comments on the document I would ask you, 
witness, to give me some information as to whether before the outbreak of 
war in September 1939 studies or plans for an attack in the West had been 
drafted in the National Defense of the OKW and whether that such plans 
existed. 
 
A.  No, neither sutdies [sic] nor plans of this type were in existence 
nor have they ever been referred to. 
 
Q.  Did you yourself ever make suggestions regarding the examination of 
this question? 
 
A.  I have given no suggestions as regards the attack in the West and a 
consideration of such an attack but in the Spring of 1939 when the first 
ideas and plans about a possible war with Poland became known to me I was 
under the apprehension that this might entail a war against the Western 
powers and because of this idea I suggested to Keitel that a war game be 
worked out in which such a position was the  
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underlying idea.  That is to say a compilation on Germany to defend 
herself against an attack of the Western powers.  Keitel refused.  Then 
by other means I tried to point out the danger which might result from 
such a development and in this connection I still recall the detail.  I 
submitted the compilations to Keitel regarding the numbers and the 
caliber of the French heavy artillery and about the number and the 
thickness of the French tanks, I had chosen those two arms because in 
this field Germany was infinitely weaker then France and I could hope 
that a comparison of the figures, the French and the German figures, 
would not fail to have some effect on Hitler.  Keitel returned these 
tabulations to me forthwith, stating Hitler did not wish to see such 
things, so I had to cease my endeavors.<p style="text-align: 
center;">[....] 
24 June 1948-A-ED-20-1-Spears (Schaeffer) 
COURT V, CASE XII 
 
(The hearing reconvened at 1515 hours.) 
 
THE MARSHAL:  The Tribunal is again in session. 
 
WALTER WARLIMONT - Resumed 
 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) 
 
BY DR. LEVERKUEN [sic]: 
 
Q  We had stopped, General, when we discussed Document 523-PS, on page 7 
of the original.  On that page there are a number of handwritten 
notations.  Do you recognize the handwriting or the handwritings? 
 
A  It's all Jodl's handwriting. 
 
Q  Then follows yet another draft on page 9 of the original. 
 
A  Keitel's handwriting as well appears there. 
 
Q  Now let's turn to page 13 of the original.  That is headed "Third 
Draft".  Who wrote that notation "Third Draft"? 
 
A  That was written in Jodl's handwriting. 
 
Q  According to the document book there is a handwritten notation also on 
that page which states "on the 17th in the evening put into the final 
form by the Fuehrer personally". 
 
A  Yes. 
 
Q  Who wrote that? 
 
A  Jodl wrote it and he initialed it. 
 
Q  During this time, did Jodl give you any information about these 
various drafts and his oral reports to Hitler? 
 
A  No.  I had no more information about these happenings. 
 
Q  Please turn to Document 498-PS, which is Exhibit 124. 
 
A  Now, this is the order in the final version as Hitler himself dictated 
it and signed it. 
 
Q  On the lefthand [sic] corner on the top of the first page there is a 
reference.  Does that conclude any participation of your department in 
this version of the order? 
 
A  No.  The heading now reads "Fuehrer".  Underneath, "OKW/WFST, 
Wehrmacht Operational Staff)".  This is written in abbreviated letters. 
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The number of the order was probably taken from the registry office which 
was located in my staff. 
 
Q  In this connection I shall also put to you Document Exhibit 1270--
correction 1269.  I shall leave the sequence which I have set myself for 
a moment and turn to this document which is Document NOKW-2906, contained 
in Document Book 3 Supplement, page 15 of the English and 48 of the 
German. 
 
A  This is a memorandum for an oral report of Department Q.  The 
memorandum is signed by me, and it is addressed to Jodl.  It is dated the 
26th of November 1942, that is, more than a month after Hitler's order 
had been issued.  In this report memorandum it is stated that the General 
Staff of the German Army deems it necessary to withdraw those copies of 
the Commando Order which have been distributed lower than the 
headquarters of Armies.  The General Staff of the German Army moved that 
this be done in accordance with his authority in the Eastern Theater.  I 
take up this suggestion in the report memorandum and I ask Jodl to bring 
about a decision to the effect that this order be destroyed generally, 
not only in the east at echelons lower than Army level.  The purpose here 
again was to contribute to the fact that this order be forgotten and 
disregarded.   
 
Q  Will you please glance at the last sentence in this report memorandum? 
 
A  In the last sentence I point out to Jodl that the Commando Order of 
Hitler is dated the 18th of October in accordance with Jodl's report 
before Hitler was provided with a special distribution list and a special 
notation to the distribution list.  I stress this fact particularly 
because according to this I was not in a position to make any different 
decision nor was Jodl, since even the distribution list for the Commando 
Order, as is revealed by this sentence was ordered by Hitler himself. 
 
Q  That would refer to the distribution list which can be found in 
Document 498-PS at the end of the document on page 4? 
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A  Yes, that is correct.  That is the distribution list to which this 
sentence refers. 
 
Q  As a rule, who gave instructions as to how orders were to be 
distributed to the subordinate troop units? 
 
A  That was an office matter of a technical nature which the office chief 
himself would regulate. 
 
Q  Then this was an exception? 
 
A  Yes, this was a very special exception. 
 
Q  Now, is this Hitler order of the 18th of October 1942 in accordance 
with your suggestions? 
 
A  No.  Nothing was left either in substance or in wording of my 
suggestions, which I included in my order draft of the 15th of October on 
instructions from Jodl.  My suggestion was never brought to Hitler's 
attention because in the most decisive aspects Jodl had changed it before 
it was even shown to Hitler. 
 
Q  And one of the essential points was the turning over of the decision 
to the troops? 
 
A  Yes.  According to my opinion and to my wishes, that was the most 
decisive factor and, as can be seen from the photostatic copy, Jodl 
crossed it out in the first draft in his own handwriting. 
 
Q  Do you know that his testimony before the International Military 
Tribunal Jodl made a statement to the effect that for all practical 
purposes he had no connection with the Commando Order? 
 
A  Yes, I know that, and I not only know that but I also know that he 
said at the time that his staff, that is, myself, drew up a draft on our 
own initiative.  Here again I am afraid his memory failed him.  It is 
evident that this drawing up of a draft was not done on my own initiative 
from one of the documents which was discussed just now, which starts with 
the words, "According to the orders the following is submitted." 
 
Q  Now, as to Document 523, Exhibit 123, you have no doubt in 
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identifying Jodl's handwriting in several places in the photostat? 
 
A  I don't have the slightest doubt that it is Jodl's handwriting. 
 
Q  I shall now put to you Exhibit 125, Document 503-PS in Document Book 4 
of the prosecution on page 39 of the English text and page 50 of the 
German text. 
 
A  Immediately following Hitler's Commando Order he issued a further 
explanatory order.  This again was drafted by Hitler himself exclusively, 
as I learned immediately at the time.  In this order he states reasons 
for issuing the order.  He compares, among other things, the activity of 
the Commandos with the partisan warfare in the east.  In this connection 
I should like to state that in doing so he made exactly the same 
statement, as is contained in the British regulation, because therein it 
says that the members of Commando units are to fight in the same manner 
as partisans.  Furthermore, the especial significance of Hitler's 
additional order is to be seen in the fact that in the last paragraphs 
which are on page 7 of the original he threatens heavy punishment for all 
those who disobey his order.  I should like to read the sentence, 
"Officers or non-commissioned officers who for some weakness fail are to 
be reported without any consideration or under circumstances when there 
is danger in delay to be called to strict account at once." 
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Q.  Following this page, by which I mean the last page of this document 
503-PS, is a communication by the OKW.  It is signed "Jodl".  Is that 
partof [sic] the previous document? 
 
A.  Yes, that is a cover letter, the letter of transmission.  It has the 
date of the following day, the 19th Of October. 
 
Q.  Did you have any part in the originof [sic] this communication? 
 
A.  No, neither I nor my department had the slightest part in it. 
 
Q.  Will you please glance at the past page at the distribution list in 
the last but one paragraph which says, "21st copy: Armed Forces 
Operational Staff Q" and immediately after it abbreviated "Draft".  Now, 
what do these words mean? 
 
A.  Subsequently Jodl sent his staff that is, the Armed Forces 
Operational Staff and within this staff, Division Q, the draft of this 
order to file. 
 
MR. RAPP:  May I inquire.  I didn't quite get the translation of 
this.  Would the interpreter be so kind as to repeat this?  Can you hear 
me? 
 
INTERPRETER:  I want the witness to repeat it.  I can't remember it all. 
 
MR. RAPP: Would that be all right, Your Honor? 
 
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think I know what he said.  That last on this 
distribution list, where it refers to OKW/West, High Command of the Armed 
Forces, Armed Forces Operational Staff II, 12.  That that was sent to 
that department later for filing purposes, if I have it right. 
 
MR RAPP: Yes, I understand that, too, your Honor.  The only thing I was 
interested in is how the German word "Entwurf" was translated.  That is 




MR. RAPP:  That is something I would like to contest.  It is not draft 
but "original" in this particular case.  The literal translation of 
course is "draft" but what is meant here is of course one  
24 June 48-A-SW-21-2-Spears (Schaeffer) 
Court 5, Case 12 
 
"original".  I just wanted to get that in the record and if we have any 
difficulties on it we can get an opinion from the Translating Division. 
 
DR. LEVERKUEHN:  I cannot quite share Mr. Rapp's opinion here.  The 
translation of one word "Entwurf" is only "draft". 
 
MR. RAPP: Well, if Your Honor please, I already suggested that we submit 
it to the Translating Division.  Our position is that in military 
terminology the word "Entwurf" means "original," while in the usage 
amongst civilians the word means "draft", but amongst themilitary [sic], 
it means "original".  That is our contention. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: That will be noted on the document. 
 
DR. LEVERKUEHN:  In the event that this question might arise later on and 
might prove of any importance, I should like to reserve the right to give 
the reasons for my opinion.  At the moment, I don't think that is 
necessary.  I now put to you Exhibit 126, NOKW-1757, on page 44 of 
Document Book 4 in the English text and on page 55 of Document Book 4 in 
the German text. 
 
THE WITNESS: This document again contains a copy of Hitler's order of the 
18th of October which is the so-called Commando Order, and prevised to it 
is a communication from the OKH, the General Staff of the German Army 
Operations Section.  This cover letter distributes the order to the Army 
Groups in the east.  In addition, the order is distributed to a large 
number of other agencies which were subordinate to the OKH. 
 
BY DR. LEVERKUEHN: 
 
Q.  I will now put to you the three subsequent documents in a body, 
Exhibits 135, 137, and 138.  Exhibit 135 is Document 508-PS contained in 
Document Book 4 on page 74 of the English text and 86 of the German text; 
137 is 527-PS contained in Document 4 on page 78 of the English document 
book and page 91 of the German document book; Exhibit 138 is on page 80 
of English Document Book 4, 512-PS, and page 93 of the German Document 
Book 4. 
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A.  The first document 508-PS contains a note from a Operational Section 
Air Force of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff.  This is dated the 21st of 
November 1942.  According to this a British sabotage unit landed in 
Norway and by virtue of the Commando order its members were 
executed.  The note is signed by a member of the staff. 
 
Q.  Would you please look at the distribution list? 
 
A.  The note was sent primarily to General Jodl.  In brackets it states 
"Previously transmitted by telephone", which shows the procedure which 
was used in all these cases, namely, that the information couldn't be 
sent quickly enough to Compound 1.  I am listed as the second agency on 
this distribution list which received a copy and then follow other 
sections within the staff. 
 
Q.  Exhibit 137 on page 78 of the English document Book? 
 
A.  I should like to remain with Exhibit 135 for another moment and point 
out page 2 of the original.  On this page is a supplementary letter of 
the Department Foreign Countries Counter Intelligency addressed to the 
Armed Forces Operational Staff.  Attached to this letter are two 
teletypes which deal with the same Norwegian matter and are addressed to 
Department Foreign Countries Counter Intelligence.  These show that the 
Armed Forces Commander in Norway issued an order in connection with this 
incident.  According to this order the Commando Order was not to be 
carried out for the time being but interrogations were to be held 
first.  The Department Foreign Countries Counter Intelligence inquiries 
on instigation of the Armed Forces Commander Norway of the Armed Forces 
Operational Staff whether that was in accordance with the opinion held in 
the Armed Forces Operational Staff.  Now, I would like to turn to Exhibit 
137. 
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THE PRESIDENT: I would like to ask a question.  Were these commandos shot 
by members of the OKW? 
 
THE WITNESS: No, Your Honor. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: By whom? 
 
THE WITNESS: In the first note only the following information is 
given.  Air Fleet V, which is the Supreme Command of the Air Force in 
Norway, reports that the Fuehrer Order was carried out.  Now who carried 
out the Fuehrer Order is not evident from the note. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: The Air Fleet V was a part of the Wehrmacht, wasn't it? 
 
THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: Then, if it was carried out by the SD, then the Wehrmacht 
is reporting it? 
 
THE WITNESS: Perhaps I might just glance through the subsequent pages of 
the document to see whether any further indication is given as to who 
carried out the executions. 
 
DR. LEVERKUEHN: Perhaps you would glance at Document 508-PS, page 3 of 
the original. 
 
THE WITNESS: Yes, on page 3 of the original of Document 508-PS it is 
stated, that the 280th Division, a Division of the German Army decreed 
carrying out of the action in accordance with Fuehrer Order.  The action 
was carried out on the evening of the 20th of November.  This I believe 
shows almost with certainty that soldiers of the 280th Division, a 
division of the German Army, carried out the executions. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: That was a military action, or a military reprisal? 
 
THE WITNESS: In this case, it was an execution of the order, Your Honor 
as the order was interpreted by the Division. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: That is all. 
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A (Continued) I should like to deal with Exhibit 137, which is an inquiry 
from a member of Department Q of the Armed Forces Operational Staff 
addressed to the Armed Forces Commander in Norway.  The inquiry deals 
with the request of the Armed Forces Commander Norway that he should be 
permitted to hold interrogations in the future before applying the 
Commando Order.  This member of the staff, (a Referent) apparently, had 
some doubts as to whether or not such interrogations were admissible in 
accordance with Hitler's order and he asked in this teletype for further 
clarification. 
 
Now let us turn to the third document, which is Exhibit 138, Document 
512-PS, Document Book IV, page 80 of the English, and 93 of the German a 
communication dated the 14th of December, 1942, and we find the answer of 
the Armed Forces Commander Norway.  This teletype was primarily addressed 
to the Department Foreign Countries Counter INtelligence in Berlin 
through which office the inquiry of the Armed Forces Commander Norway to 
the Armed Forces Operational Staff had been channeled for 
information.  This communication is addressed to Norway directly.  In 
this reply, the Armed Forces Commander Norway is told that he is correct 
in his assumption that interrogations are to be held before application 
of the order.  I myself initaled [sic] this teletype. 
 
Q  Why did you deem it so important to have interrogations held before 
the application of the order? 
 
A  It had been my idea from the very start, an idea which I expressed in 
one first draft of the order which was dated the 14th or 15th of 
October.  By such interrogations, it was to be determined first of all 
whether a violation of the rules of war could be established and secondly 
by this method, the prisoners were to be taken from the competency of the 
SD.  As a consequence I used this opportunity to discuss 
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this whole incident in great detail with Admiral Canaris.  We then 
reached the conclusion that Canaris' Counter-Intelligence Offices which 
were attached to the echelons as low as the divisions, were to be called 
in to conduct interrogations of all captured commando units as a matter 
of principle.  Canaris took upon himself the responsibility for 
instructing his counter-intelligence officers to the effect that soldiers 
if they could not be convicted of having committed any serious offenses 
were not to be turned over to the SD but sent to prisoner of war 
camps.  That, of course, is not stated in this communication, but this is 




BY JUDGE HARDING: 
 
Q  I would like to ask a question.  After this interrogation, no matter 
whether these men were charged as I understand it, with the violation of 
the International Law or not, according to the order they had to be shot 
anyhow, as I understand this.  Am I correct in that? 
 
A  Yes, Your Honor, that was the moaning and the wording of Hitler's 
order. 
 
Q  Then how are they protected by interrogation? 
 
A  Through interpolating the counter-intelligence agencies in these 
interrogations, we kept the SD away.  Counter-Intelligence officers, that 
is, officers who were soldiers themselves were now carrying out the 
interrogations.  Thus it could be established sometimes that the 
interrogations were not members of the commando unit but, for instance, 
were soldiers who were dispersed, who were carrying out reconnaissance 
tasks above the coast or were otherwise participating in a regular 
military operation.  In such cases they were protected against being 
treated in accordance with the commando order; but even 
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if it was proved that they were members of a commando unit but had not 
committed any punishable serious offenses, they would not be treated in 
this manner and in spite of everything, they would be turned over to the 
prisoner of war camps, and that was the purpose of the agreement. 
 
Q  Why did you want these men not turned over to the SD? 
 
A  Because we wanted soldiers in prisoner of war camps under our own 
supervision, if they had behaved like soldiers, since after all we didn't 
know what the SD would do with them. 
 




Q  The SD was a civilian or a military organization? 
 
A  It was not a military organization.  It was a police organization. 
 
Q  Well, if it wasn't military, then it had to be a civilian 
organization, no matter what it was, wouldn't it? 
 
A  Yes. 
 
Q  And you say you didn't know what would happen if they were turned over 
to the SD?  I thought I noticed in one of these communications that the 
SD was objecting--it is found here in Exhibit 138, - "the Chief of the 
Security Police protested after the immediate carrying out of the Fuehrer 
Order and intend for their part to bring up the whole question as a 
matter of principle."  Now they were objecting to any suspense, were they 
not? 
 
A  Yes, here, apparently the Commander of the Security Police in Norway 
himself objected against this first commando whom I mentioned earlier, 
being shot by the troops.  That was not in accordance with Hitler's 
Commando Order, anyway. 
 
Q  In other words, they were to be turned over to the  
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civilian police by the military for shooting.  That's what he objected to 
not being done, wasn't it? 
 
A  Yes, Your Honor.  Above all he wanted those people for interrogation, 
perhaps in order to discover the possibilities of a sabotage 
organization.  I believe that was the real reason. 
 
BY JUDGE HARDING: 
 
Q  Well, what good did it do these men in this case if they were 
interrogated first, they were all shot anyhow? 
 
A  No, Your Honor, Admiral Canaris saw to it that most of them, were not 
shot.  They were brought into prisoner of war camps instead. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed. 
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Q.  (By Leverhuehn) Will you please once again turn to Exhibit 135.  That 
is Document 508-PS, on page 3 of the original, which is page 5 in the 
document book.  There it is stated, "Under their khaki uniform, without 
insignia on their sleevs, some of the prisoners wore blue ski 
suits."  What is the significance of this sentence? 
 
A. The members of this commando unit, in accordance with its description, 
were apparently not recognizable as soldiers.  In addition they wore 
under their khaki uniforms, top clothing blue ski wuites [sic].  This 
could only have meant that after having carried out their assignment, 
they would discard their khaki uniforms and then appear in blue ski suits 
and disperse and never be seen again. 
 
Q.  I should like to refer you once more to the notation at the end of 
the document, Exhibit 138, 512-PS, which was just now referred to by 
Judge Harding.  There it is stated that the Commander of the SD 
objects.  What is the meaning of this protest, according to your opinion, 
mainly taking into consideration the Norwegian conditions? 
 
A.  It is evident from this protest that the events were carefully 
observed by the Commander of the Security Police and also by the Reich 
Commissar who is mentioned in the same connection.  The Armed Forces 
Commander Norway, in all these measures, was also subject to control on 
the part of the Party. 
 
Q.  Was there any contact between you and the Armed Forces Commander 
Norway with respect to commandos? 
 
A.  No, the Armed Forces Commander, Norway, addressed himself to 
Department Foreign Countries Counter-Intelligence in this instance also. 
 
Q.  Do you [happen] to remember whether he had any immediate contact with 
Keitel and whether he addressed himself to Keitel directly in this 
matter? 
 
A.  I know that only from interrogations which were held here in 
Nuremberg in Fall, 1945. 
 
Q.  You had no possibility then of influencing the Armed Forces Commander 
Norway? 
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A.  No, I hadn't. 
 
Q.  I shall now put to you two further exhibits, Exhibit 139 and 140, 
which belong together.  They are NOKW-002 contained in Document Book IV, 
on page 82 of the English text, and Page 96 of the German text, and 
Exhibit 140-1616, on page 84 of Document Book IV in the English text and 
on page 100 in the German text. 
 
A.  Both documents refer to an incident which happened in Bordeaux in 
December 1942.  At that time and English sabotage unit had succeeded in 
penetrating into the port of Bordeaux.  Four ships were seriously 
damaged.  The port of Bordeaux was very important at that particular time 
since the so-called blockade breakers who commuted between East Asia and 
Germany were trying to enter this port. 
 
The Document NOKW-002 consists of actually of three teletypes.  The first 
of these is addressed to the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff 
Jodl.  It was sent to him directly without my seeing it 
previously.  Jodl's General Staff Officer then noted in the heading of 
this teletype, "known" and with this word on it it was sent back to a 
major who was a member of the staff.  This shows that in this instance 
also the incident was already known through some other channels which I 
am not in a position to uncover.  The report which was submitted here 
arrived therefore, as a secondary report, that is too late.  I did not 
initial this report, not even when it was sent back. 
 
The second teletype, which is included in this document, is completely 
illegible, I cannot comment on it.  The third teletype is addressed to 
the Operational Division of the Armed Forces Operational Staff.  It 
emanated from the Commander in Chief, West.  Therein no statements are 
contained about the treatment of prisoners which might have arisen on the 
occasion of this incident.  This last mentioned teletype passed through 
my hands.  Jodl himself, however, took over dealing with this 
information.  According to the address on the left-hand side of the 
teletype, he informed Hitler of its contents because it says here, 
"Fuehrer is informed", and then at the end of the teletype he added a 
number of handwritten notations as to  
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how the matter was to be dealt with further.  These notations mainly 
refer to the fact that Franco-Spanish border near Bordeauxxwas [sic] to 
be protected against its crossing by commando members. 
 
The next document to be discussed is Exhibit 140, NOKW-1616.  This is a 
report of the German Army.  It has the typewritten signature of Field 
Marshal von Rundstedt.  Therein the events in Bordeaux are related.  This 
refers to Paragraph 1, Arabic 1.  It is not evident in any way that this 
report was also sent to the OKW. 
 
Q.  Now, I want to put to you Exhibit 142, which is Document 526-PS, on 
page 87 of the English text of Document Book IV.  This is a note made by 
Department Q-III.  It deals with a sabotage operation in Norway, and it 
was compiled on the 10th of May, 1943.  This note is not signed.  I did 
not initial it.  Therefore, I have to assume that it was not brought to 
my attention at the time. 
 
Q.  Then follows Exhibit 143, which is Document 518-PS, on page 88 of the 
English text in Document Book IV, and page 110 of the German text. 
 
A.  This likewise is a note drawn up by the Quartierneister Division of 
the Armed Forces Operational Staff.  Therein it is mentioned that the 
British Government has asked for clarification concerning the treatment 
of British sabotage troops.  According to the photostat I was not 
informed of this communication at the time.  On the other hand, a 
handwritten note made by a member of the staff who dealt with the 
communication reads, and I quote: "The original of this note, initialed 
by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, I delivered 
personally to Ambassador Ritter today."  Ambassador Ritter was the 
liaison official of the Foreign Office. 
 
Q.  Do you remember having had any part in this affair? 
 
A.  No. 
 
Q.  The next document is Exhibit 144, Document 516-PS, on page 89 of the 
English text, and 112 of the German text, in Document Book IV. 
24 June-A-JP-23-4-Hoxsie (Int. Schaeffer) 
 
Court V, Case XII 
 
A.  This again is a note drawn up by the Quartiermeister Division dated 
the same day, 10 May 1943.  This note was apparently intended for me.  I 
initialed it on the top-right-hand corner.  The expert dealing with the 
communications reports to me that Jodl had the Commando Order submitted 
to him by the expert who sends me the communication. 
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In paragraph 2 the addition remark to the Armed Forces report of the 7th 
of October is repeated.  In paragraph 3 the incidents are enumerated 
which had immediately preceded the Hitler order o the 18th of October 
1942.  I assume that Jodl had these incidents related to him in order to 
be able to draw up the note for the Foreign Office which was just 
discussed.  Here again he dealt directly with one of my staff 
members.  The staff member in this case fulfilled his duty in 
subsequently informing me of his work. 
 
Q  Now, I shall put to you the two next documents, Exhibit 145 and 
Exhibit 146, together.  Exhibit 145 is Document 514PS contained in 
Document Book IV on page 91 of the English and 114 of the German 
text.  Exhibit 146 is Document 549PS contained in Document Book IV on 
page 92 of the English and 116 of the German text. 
 
A  These documents also refer to the inquiry from the British 
Government.  The first of these is a teletype from the Armed Forces 
Operational Staff Q addressed to the Armed Forces Commander Norway.  In 
this teletype a number of questions are put which are necessary for the 
compilation of the reply note for the protective power of the British 
Government.  Here again any initial or sign on my part is 
missing.  Apparently this matter was directly dealt with between Jodl and 
a member of Department Q.  The second document, Exhibit 146, contains on 
page 5 of the original at the end of the document a communication 
addressed to the Foreign Office dated 11th May 1943 which is initialed by 
the man in charge of Q Department.  This communication contains an 
enumeration of all those notes which have been made available to the 
Foreign Office in order to compile the reply note to the protective power 
of the British Government.  In paragraph 2 a picture is mentioned which I 
discussed earlier, a picture of the British agent with a gangster 
pistol.  The other parts of the document deal with the same 
question.  Amongst them, the answer from Norway to the questions 
previously mentioned is referred to.  My initial only appears once in all 
these various communications.  On the 15th of May I was 
24 June 1948-A-ED-24-2-Leonard (Schaeffer) 
 
COURT V, CASE XII 
 
subsequently informed what answers had arrived from Norway.  No new facts 
are contained in these replies compared with those which had been known 
earlier. 
 
Q  The second document...I beg you pardon.  We'll have to deal with that 
now.  That is Exhibit 147, Document 517 PS contained in Document Book IV 
on page 95 of the English and 122 of the German text. 
 
A  This again is a note of the Quartermaster Division which summarizes 
again the events related just now.  According to this, Ambassador Ritter 
of the Foreign Office had drawn up a draft for the answer to the British 
Government and this draft was sent for informational purposes to the OKW 
before dispatch.  This draft of the Foreign Office mainly adhered to the 
note which Jodl had already sent to the Foreign Office on the 10th of 
May.  This note went through my hands and was passed on to Keitel since 
Jodl had gone on sick leave in the meantime.  Keitel gave his consent to 
this draft of the Foreign Office.  This is evident from the note at the 
end which was added by the staff member who worked on the draft. 
 
Q  I will now put to you Exhibit 148 which is Document 519PS on page 104 
of the English test [sic] and page 10 in Document IV B of the German 
version. 
 
A  This is again a file note of the Quartermaster Division.  It is dated 
the 24th of May.  In this file note it is merely stated that the Foreign 
Minister had orally reported to Hitler the contents of the note to the 
British Government or to the British Government's protective power, and 
that Hitler had consented to the contents of the note. 
 
Q  I shall now put to you Exhibit 149, NOKW 004 contained in Document 
Book IV on page 97 of the English text and page 1 of Document Book IV B 
in the German version. 
 
A  This document consists of two parts.  The second part, on page 2 of 
the original, is the earlier incident which I would like to discuss 
first.  The date is the 18th of May 1943.  This is a communication from 
the Chief of the Prisoner of War Affairs, addressed to the Armed Forces 
Opera- 
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tional Staff, Division Q.  Therein it is inquired whether, if members of 
enemy commando units are killed in action they are to be reported in the 
customary manner to the enemy state.  After some long consideration this 
communication was answered by the Armed Forces Operational Staff on 25th 
May, page 1 of the document.  It bears my signature, by oder.  In this 
reply I state that reports to the enemy state in such instances should be 
avoided.  The reason which is not contained in the communication was the 
following: I knew and I had initiated it myself, together with Canaris, 
that the troops were to make false reports in this respect.  I did not 
know the report channels of the Prisoner of War Division, and I had to 
fear that through these reports a new channel would be opened for Hitler 
and other agencies to control and check these incidents and events.  This 
had to be avoided at all costs.  For this reason it is expressed in this 
reply that according to the opinion of the Armed Forces Operational Staff 
reports of the death of commando units are not to be made.  I added, 
however, since I was not in a position to make any decisions in the 
sphere, that it was to be left to the Chief of the Prisoner of War 
Affairs to obtain a decision from the chief of the OKW. 
 
Q  I should now like to discuss with you Exhibit 150, DOcument NOKW-188, 
contained on page 99 of the English Document Book IV and contained in 
German Document Book IV-B. 
 
A  This is an inquiry of the Armed Forces Commander in Norway, dated the 
23rd May 1943; addressed to the OKW, Armed Forces Operational 
Staff.  Herein a number of individual questions are asked which in the 
opinion of the Armed Forces Commander Norway result from the Commando 
Order.  These questions were summarized in the draft of an order which he 
himself drew up.  It is attached here for approval.  What happened to 
this draft order is not evident in the document, nor, do I have any 
recollection of it.  In the photostatic copy there are a number of 
deletions and a number of amendments which apparently originated from 
Keitel. 
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Jodl was not present at the time. 
 
Q  I will now put to you Exhibit 151, which is Document 505-PS, on page 
106 of the English Document Book IV, and page 11 of German Document Book 
IV-B. 
 
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will not have time to cover that, so the 
Tribunal will be in recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning. 
 
(Adjournment to 0930 hours, 25 June 1948.) 
<p style="text-align: center;">[....] 
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THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. 
 
BY MR. RAPP: 
 
Q  Witness, Keitel had no command authority over the OKW, OKL OR OKM, 
that's right, isn't it? 
 
A  On his own authority, no.  Only if Hitler is some individual cases 
vested such authority in him. 
 
Q  The same held true for Jodl as well as you? 
 
A  Yes, of course. 
 
Q  And the only man who actually had this authority could exercise it as 
such was Hitler? 
 
A  Yes, with the exception which I have already mentioned.  In the most 
important cases, Hitler himself signed his instructions, and, in other 
cases, had others issue them.  Then it can happen that other names except 
Hitler's name appear on such instructions. 
 
Q  Is it correct to state that Keitel exercised command authority over 
his own staff, that is, the OKW? 
 
A  Yes. 
 
Q  And you in turn were authorized to give orders to your staff within 
the Department L?  That is correct too, is it not? 
 
A  Yes, that was subject only to one restriction.  I did not have an 
authority to mete out disciplinary punishment to those officers of the 
Air Force who were members of my department.  Goering had removed this 
authority from my hands. 
 
Q  Did you ever have it or did you never get it? 
 
A  As department chief, I actually had this authority.  That is one of 
the basic rights of a department chief.  How- 
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However, an occurrence in Spring 1939 caused Goering to issue an order 
which stated that the officers of the Air Force in the OKW were not 
subject in a disciplinary respect to their superiors from other branches 
of the Armed Forces, and Keitel accepted this order. 
 
Q  Now, witness, if the OKW issued or distributed orders of some 
importance, be they operational or of another nature, to military 
agencies outside of the OKW, they were not always signed by Hitler, were 
they? 
 
A  No, not at all. 
 
Q  Who besides Keitel was authorized to sign such orders in the name of 
Hitler within WFST? 
 
A  There was no regulation which established that.  It would depend in 
each case on the importance of the order or instruction.  In your 
documents you will find documents which were signed "by order" by a 
Captain or a Major of the Armed Forces Operational Staff.  A frequent 
method was that such a decree would be preceded by this "The Fuehrer has 
order".  Then the document was possibly signed by Keitel or Jodl without 
the letters showing "by order".  I have to correct my statement.  It was 
only Keitel who could do that, not Jodl. 
 
Q  Now, witness, could either Jodl or you sign such an order "by order"? 
 
A  Yes.  With the words "by order" we could sign it. 
 
Q  When an order which affected outside agencies of the OKW bore Keitel's 
signature then it was understood, was it not, that Keitel, in signing 
such an order, had acted as Hitler's agent?  That is to say, as his 
attorney in fact, and the same would apply to Jodl, isn't that right? 
 
A  Yes. 
 
Q  Now, was there anybody in the WFST besides you or  
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Jodl who could sign an order of major importance "Im Auftrag" that is, 
"by order"? 
 
A  With the exception of a few specific cases which were based on 
definite conditions such as the physical separation between Jodl and the 
staff, I also could not sign orders of major importance.  However, less 
important matters, also cover letters to important communications, were 
also signed by members of the staff subordinate to me, and I might remind 
you of the cover letter to the decree about jurisdiction which is at 
issue here.  This cover letter was signed Lieutenant Colonel von 
Teppelskirch. 
 
Q  Now, for instance, witness, your aide de camp your Ordonnanzoffizier, 
who appeared here as a witness, he wouldn't for instance, have been 
authorized to sign an order of major importance "by order", would he? 
 
A  No, he had no definite sphere of work, either. 
 
Q  Now, since Keitel and Jodl and you were signing as attorneys in fact 
or agents it did some time time [sic] happen, did it not, that you 
affixed your name to orders of whose contents you did not personally 
approve? 
 
A  Yes, that ahppened [sic]. 
 
Q  Now, it is true, witness, is it not, that if the OKS, OKM or OKL or a 
commander in the field would have received an order from the OKW signed 
by you "by order", they would not have questoned [sic] the validity of 
such an order, would they? 
 
A  I cannot remember any case of that type.  The reason, however, for 
that might well be that I was reserved in putting my signature on 
documents. 
 
Q  Now, the carrying out of such an order, witness, was not in any way 
delayed or actually did not take place because Jodl or Keitel or you 
signed such an order "by order", was it? 
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A  No, that would not depend on the manner or the name on the 
signature.  It depended solely on the contents of the communication. 
 
Q  So, witness, the presence or absence of the words "Im Auftrag" "by 
order" added nothing to the force of your signature, did it? 
 
A  I don't understand what you mean. 
 
Q  Well now, if you signed an order "Im Auftrag" the person that would 
carry out such an order would not carry it out just because you added 
these words, did they? 
 
A  That was the decisive factor.  If I had not added the words "by order" 
a storm of indignation would have resulted questioning the right and 
authority of mine to sign orders on my own initiative.  Those words "by 
order" were the most decisive words. 
 
Q  If I followed your theory you expounded on direct examination 
correctly you maintained that the presence of these two letters "IA" "Im 
Auftrag", above your signature released you of all liability for the 
contents of the orders which you signed or the results which followed 
from its issuance, isn't that correct? 
 
A  In the military official sense that's entirely correct. 
 
Q  So, in your opinion, witness, no matter whether you signed "by order" 
or not "by order" you were not responsible in either case? 
 
A  No, that is not what I said.  An order without the preceding addition 
"by order" could only be issued by me to my own staff, my own 
department.  Let me give you an example.  I could issue such an order as 
to how work was to be distributed, what night service was to be arranged, 
how incoming teletypes were to be treated, etc., and I was fully 
responsible for such instructions in the official 
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military sense of the word.  Now, as to contents of orders which I signed 
"by order" I was not responsible for those in the military official sense 
of the word, but perhaps I might approach the subject from another 
respect. 
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If the recipient of an order which I signed "by order" did not agree to 
this order, did not approve of it, he would not address himself to me but 
he would address hinself [sic] to the men in charge of the agency, either 
Jodl or Keitel because the recipient would know that on my own authority 
could not issue any orders. 
 
Q  Now neither could Keitel nor could Jodl, as far as outside agencies of 
the OKW were concerned.  Isn't that right? 
 
A  Yes, that is correct, but these two officers were very much closer to 
Hitler than I was and knew his intentions and that was known throughout 
the whole of the armed forces.  Therefore, recipients of orders would 
know that these were the persons to turn to if they wanted to know more 
details or if they wanted to make representations.  That is the 
explanation. 
 
Q  Do the burden of your testimony is now that though the carrying out of 
an order by the triips, if it were signed by Keitel or Jodl, either by 
order or not by order, would have been carried out, but only your orders 
would have been carried out it they have the letter [sic] IA in front. 
 
A  I am afraid I still didn't make it clear enough.  Perhaps I might once 
again show you the two examples.  Orders which Hitler signed himself can 
be disregarded for the moment.  NExt to those there was the formulation 
which showed at the heading OKW or Chief of the OKW.  That heading 
referred to Keitel.  If, in orders headed by this line, the first 
sentence read, "The Fuehrer has ordered," then Keitel would sign such an 
order without the letters IA, i.e. by orders, because he was the man who 
represented the OKW.  That is the only case when an order of Hitler may 
be signed by one of his subordinates without the additional letters IA, 
by order. 
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The second case: If such orders of the same type with the heading OKW and 
the introductory sentence, "The Fuehrer has ordered" not signed by Keitel 
himself, Jodl could sign them, "by order", which means by order of the 
Chief of the OKW, Keitel.  In less importance instances I could do the 
same. 
 
Q  Thus the burden of your testimony indicates that "by order" you could 
set your name to any order to outside agencies with complete impunity, 
that is to say, no matter how criminal the order was you were perfectly 
at liberty to sign and distribute it because you felt that you were 
immune from criminal responsibility.  Isn't that the burden of your 
testimony? 
 
A  You are now bringing an aspect into this issue which at the time was 
completely outside considerations on my part.  Therefore, I can't answer 
that question. 
 
Q  I am talking about, witness, the burden of your testimony here in this 
court, you have laid very great stress on the point that these orders 
were signed by order, Warlimont.  Isn't that right? 
 
A  I have quite generally stated that this authority existed and that now 
and again I made use of this authority.  I further said that a 
responsibility in the military official sense of the word was not 
connected with my person in such instances.  Any recipient of any order 
know that. 
 
Q  This being your theory, I would like to ask you whether or not 
actually only Hitler was the only man in the OKW who under your concept 
of military administration could be held liable, criminally liable, 
because he held command authority? 
 
A  Yes, only Hitler had command authority. 
 
Q  But I presume that he could not be held liable either witness, because 
he was the head of State and as such immune? 
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A  That is an idea which never occurred to me.  In the military sense of 
course he was responsible for the orders which he issued. 
 
Q  Witness, I'd like to discuss with you for a few minutes the operation 
Weseruebung, the attack on Norway.  Isn't it true, witness, that sometime 
in January 1940 a special staff was set up under Admiral Kranke which was 
to prepare the preliminary plan? 
 
A  The order concerning this was issued on the 27th of January.  The 
three officers of the staff were initiated in their missions by Keitel on 
the 5th of February 1940.  Therefore, all this took place around the end 
of the January and the beginning of February. 
 
Q  It is true, is it not, that one of your subalterns, Oberst 
Tippelskirch, was delegated to do duty within that staff of Admiral 
Kranke? 
 
A  No,  you are mistaken there.  Tippelskirch was a Major at that 
time.  He came from a field unit.  He had been Ia of a division.  He was 
transferred into this staff.  Before that date I didn't even know him 
personally, even less was he a member of Department L. It was only later 
in the fall of 1940 that he was transferred into Department L, National 
Defense. 
 
Q  Now, witness, is it correct that for reasons of security this was the 
first operation up to then which was prepared entirely within the OKW and 
practically without the knowledge of OKH? 
 
A  No, it wasn't quite like this.  Hitler ordered that the preparations 
for this operation were to be essentially made in the OKW.  For this 
purpose he appointed the special staff which was later on directed by 
Admiral Kranke and which was accomodated [sic] in the offices of the 
armed forces operational  
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staff, but these three officers and there weren't any more, could not, on 
their own prepare an operation.  They could not tell the German Army, "We 
shall need six or eight divisions soon in the future, but we are not 
going to tell you for what purpose."  Of course these officers had to 
cooperate with the high commands of the armed forces and that is what 
they did.  The development, the elaboration of the actual plan, however, 
the coordination of the three branches of the armed forces for this 
operation, that was the task of this special staff. 
 
Q  Now, in the event this special staff under Kranke needed certain basic 
information, let us say, maps, would they consult with you to try to get 
these maps for them? 
 
A  Particularly in this question of the maps a rather strange incident 
occurred, the German armed forces didn't possess any maps of Norway.  The 
Department L, National Defense, did not have any maps either.  Kranke 
committed an incautious action and sent a few officers to Berlin to buy 
maps of Norway in book shops.  Now this became known to enemy 
intelligence service.  In this connection, therefore, he could not find 
any help and assistance from me.  On the other hand I had received the 
instructions to make clerks, designers, stationery, etc. available to 
him, everything that belonged to the activity of a staff.  I was also 
instructed to accomodate [sic] him near the offices of my own 
department.  This happened. 
 
Q  Did you ever discuss with Kranke the progress he was making? 
 
A  This is a question which I have put to myself during the long weeks of 
this trial.  I cannot recall, however, to have discussed this matter with 
Kranke and even less with the Colonel of the air force who was a member 
of this staff.  But, 
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I believe that occasionally I asked Colonel Tippelskirch about the 
progress of the work.  The whole matter only lasted two and a half weeks. 
 
Q  Now, after Kranke General Falkenhorst stepped into the pictures.  Now, 
if General Falkenhorst needed for his operation certain guns, troops, or 
special equipment, did he look to you to try to find out whom he was to 
approach and how he could obtain that material or did he never at all 
discuss such matters with you? 
 
A  General von Falkenhorst never discussed these questions with me 
officially.  Every morning he had a lengthy discussion with Keitel.  He 
himself had in earlier years been long enough in the Reich Defense 
Ministry to know the authorities he had to approach for such 
support.  His Chief of Staff who was the then Colonel Buschenhagen 
repeatedly came to see me and now and again asked me for support.  I 
cannot recall the details. 
 
Q  Now this whole preparation and planning was shrouded in such complete 
secrecy.  That is correct, is it not? 
 
A  That was the very reason why Hitler had created this particular 
organization for the planning of the campaign.  In actual fact no more 
secrecy was achieved than was observed in the case of all other 
campaigns.  Falkenhorst had to turn to the OKH in order to straighten out 
any number of details which would not be possible to straighten out 
without hte help of the OKH.  In the same way Kranke had to deal with the 
Navy and the air force officer whose name I cannot remember, with the 
high command of the air force.  It is possible of course that the circle 
of those who participated in the elaborating of these plans was somewhat 
smaller than in the case of other campaigns. 
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Q  Now the attack on Norway was launched on 10 April 1940, just when did 
you get information that this attack was to come off? 
 
A  You mean when was I informed of the date or when I was informed of the 
plans that an occupation of Norway was being considered, namely in order 
to anticipate an occupation of Norway on the part of any other nation. 
 
Q  I mean the third alternative, witness.  I mean when were you 
officially informed that Germany is set to attack Norway, that it was the 
Fuehrer's, what you may call, irrevocable intention to attack Norway. 
 
A  I presume that I was informed of this in conjunction with the creation 
of this special staff at the end of January 1940.  I am not at all sure, 
however, whether at that time the intention had been irrevocably 
determined or whether preparations were merely made in order to be 
prepared for such an operation under all circumstances.  That I can no 
longer tell you. 
 
Q  Now, witness, do you recall whether it was ever contemplated to 
organize the ground personnel outside of a certain protective zone in 
Slovakia according to military principles but have it camoflaged [sic] as 
a civilian enterprise.  Do you recall such an incident? 
 
A  We discussed the document here in this court and therefore I know you 
are referring to.  From the time when it happened, I do not remember it. 
 
Q  I'll show you the document.  It is NOKW 2571, Exhibit 1085, Book 13, 
page 137.  Now witness what was the purpose of that you said. 
 
A  I could only hazard a guess if I had to give you an answer today.  At 
any rate a camoflage [sic] was intended for military purposes, that is 
clearly evident from Section 2. 
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However, I do not know the details. 
 
Q  If I suggest to you that it had some connection with Case White, would 
that be rather far fetched? 
 
A  That's possible, but it is likewise possible that such an arrangement 
would have also made without the contingencies of Case White.  Slovakia, 
as far as I could judge, after the separation from the Czech part of the 
country was very strongly dependent on Germany. 
 
Q  Now, witness, in connection with Case White we have heard a 
considerable amount of testimony regarding Document L-79.  Now, I am not 
going over all this with you again but you did make one statement during 
direct examination which I would liek you please to clear up for me.  Now 
first of all you said-- 
 
A  Could you hand me the document, please. 
 
Q  Yes, sure.  That is Exhibit 1083 your Honor, L-79, Book 13, page 125 
in the English and 218 in the German.  You stated that Hitler may have 
suggested to Schmundt that your name be left off the list of guests to be 
called because he didn't know you and you didn't belong there. 
 
A  Yes. 
 
Q  Now, did you never have met the Fuehrer prior to that conference? 
 
A  Yes, I had, and I stated that here that for the first time I met 
Hitler in 1936 during a conference about Spain and once afterwards in 
December 1938 on the occasion of a trip which Hitler made at that time 
accompanied by approximately 50 officers into the Sudentenland.  If I 
made the statement that he didn't know me, what i meant was that he had 
no conception of me.  I knew him but he didn't know me.  I have an 
indication to prove that also. 
 
Q  Would you like to say something else? 
 
A  When Keitel, during the trip in December 1938 introduced 
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me to Hitler as the new chief of Department L, National Defense, Hitler 
looked at me without saying anything or rather he looked through me so 
that I had to have the impression that he had completely forgotten that 
two years prior to this meeting I had already attended a conference under 
his direction. 
 
Q  Now you further stated during your direct testimony that the rank you 
held at that time was not adequate or sufficient enough to warrant a 
participation at that conference. 
 
A  Yes, I said that because I had to look for reasons and I am still 
looking for reasons to explain the fact that I was not present during 
this conference. 
 
Q  Now, may I point out to you, witness, if you look at that document, 
there were four officers present at that meeting who held actually a 
lower rank than you did at that time and I may also suggest to you, 
witness, that actually for their presence I can see no excuse, as 
compared to yours.  For instance, Engel was the Liaison officer from the 
Army to the OKW. 
 
A  No. 
 
Q  yes, the commander in chief of the German Army and his chief of staff 
were present.  I feel that made Engel's participation if it was based on 
rank only somewhat superfluous.  Don't you think so? 
 
A  The four officers who are listed here and who are of a lower rank than 
I held at the time were Hitler's four adjutants and of course he called 
them in for the conference.  That only confirms what I said earlier.  He 
at that time directed through his adjutants.  They were the people who 
had to know everything in order to be able to pass on his instructions 
and directives.  At least I assume that that was the reason for their 
participation.  In addition Engel 
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was the adjutant of the German Army and not as you stated just now 
liaison officer to the OKW. 
 
Q  Just one more question, you say Hitler's four adjutants.  Adjutants 
for what? 
 
A  For all military questions which might have been discussed in Hitler's 
entourage. 
 
Q  To the individual branches of the German armed forces? 
 
A  Yes. 
 
Q  But you also say that the commanders in chief and their chiefs of 
staff were present? 
 
A  Yes. 
 
Q  So why did the adjutants have to be around? 
 
A  That might have been consistent with Hitler's methods or it might have 
been on the wish of the adjutants themselves.  I can't tell you.  I 
didn't exert any influence on their being present. 
 
Q  Witness, will you tell the court again, please, at what time you 
officially heard that the Fuehrer intended to annex Danzig and the 
Memelland as a preliminary for Case White? 
